The Gains of Unemployment Insurance to Job Match Quality in the Portuguese Labor Market by Mário Centeno & Álvaro A. Novo
THE GAINS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TO JOB
MATCH QUALITY IN THE PORTUGUESE LABOR MARKET*
Mário Centeno**
Álvaro A. Novo** 
1. INTRODUCTION
The job search ef  fort of the un  em  ployed is one of the most im  por  tant in  vest  ments in the la  bor mar  ket.
The ef  fi  ciency of this ac  tiv  ity is cru  cial to the suc  cess of the un  em  ployed, not only in terms of the like  li  -
hood of re  turn  ing to work, but also in terms of wage pro  gres  sion. As in all in  vest  ments, there are costs
in  volved. The more im  por  tant of these costs in job search are (i) the op  por  tu  nity cost in terms of fore  -
gone wages and (ii) the ou  t-o f-pocket ex  penses while un  em  ployed. The un em  ploy  ment in sur ance sys  -
tem was de  signed to smooth tran  si  tions be  tween em  ploy  ment and un  em  ploy  ment, and back to
em  ploy  ment; it par  tially sup  ports the un  em  ployed’s con  sump  tion and wel  fare. It is a cru  cial component 
of the social safety net of a modern economy.
In this pa  per, we in  ves  ti  gate the abil  ity of the un  em  ploy  ment in  sur  ance (UI) sys  tem to al  low the un  em  -
ployed to search not only for a job, but for the right job. If the un  em  ployed are given enough time to
search, they may end up with a better search out  come: a higher pay  ing job and/or a job that lasts lon  -
ger.  Ex plor ing  two  ex cep tion ally  rich  iden ti fi ca tion  strat e gies  avail able  in  the  Por tu guese  la bor  mar ket,
we in  fe  r the causal ef  fect of lon  ger UI en  ti  tle  ment pe  ri  ods on reemployment wages. The meth  od  ol  o  -
gies used pro  vide a counterfactual es  ti  mate of the reemployment wages. In other words, we es  ti  mate
the wage gains rel  a  tively to the sit  u  a  tion with shorter un  em  ploy  ment in  sur  ance cov  er  age. The ev  i  -
dence pre  sented in this ar  ti  cle is based on So  cial Se  cu  rity ad  min  is  tra  tive re  cords cov  er  ing all sub  si  -
dized un  em  ploy  ment spells initiated between January 1998 and December 2002. The results are
mixed.
We find that, on av  er  age, the im  pact of lon  ger sub  si  dized un  em  ploy  ment spells on reemployment
wages is quite small. How  ever, we con  clude that work  ers with lower pre-un  em  ploy  ment wages gain
the most. In  ter  est  ingly enough, they are also the ones that ex  tend their un  em  ploy  ment spells the least.
When en  ti  tled to a lon  ger ben  e  fit pe  riod, a worker in the first quartile of the pre-un  em  ploy  ment wage
dis tri bu  tion has an av er age rel a  tive wage gain larger than 3 per cent and a small in crease in un em ploy  -
ment du  ra  tion. How  ever, a worker from the top quartile ex  pe  ri  ence a large in  crease in un  em  ploy  ment
du ra tion and suf  fers a rel a tive wage pen alty larger than 4 per cent. Also in ter est ingly from a pol icy point 
of view, we con  clude that any rel  a  tive wage gains oc  cur early on in the un  em  ploy  ment spell. In other
words, wait  ing too long for a new em  ploy  ment car  ries a wage pen  alty, maybe due to la  bor mar  ket
stigma or de  creas  ing la  bor mar  ket at  tach  ment of the worker. Fe  males gained the most from the lon  ger
en  ti  tle  ment periods, similarly to what has been found for other countries, namely Austria.
Our  re sults  show  the  im por tant  role  of  in di vid u als’  li quid ity  con straints,  mea sured  by  pre-un em ploy -
ment wages, in shap  ing their re  ac  tion to ex  tended UI ben  e  fits. The im  pact on du  ra  tion, to  gether with
the fact that the more con  strained gain the most in terms of reemployment wages, gives better pros  -
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** Economics and Research Department, Banco de Portugal.pects  to  UI  pol i cies  tar get ing  these  in di vid u als.  These  tran si tions  out  of  un em ploy ment  are  char ac ter -
ized by a pos  i  tive reemployment  wage  elas tic ity  to  the  du ra tion  of  sub si dized  un em ploy ment.  The
pres sure to ac cept low qual ity jobs is re duced through the liquidity effect, generating better matches.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS EVIDENCE
The main the  o  ret  i  cal re  sults that we draw upon can be de  rived from the stan  dard nonstationary job
search model in Mortensen (1986). The sim  ple re  sult of ob  serv  ing lon  ger un  em  ploy  ment spells as a
re  sponse to in  creased UI ben  e  fits (usu  ally in  ter  preted as a distortionary sub  sti  tu  tion/moral haz  ard ef  -
fect) does not pre  clude the ex  is  tence of a li  quid  ity ef  fect for agents who face li  quid  ity con  straints. The
li quid ity  ef fect  in tro duces  het er o ge ne ity  in  the  UI  im pact  on  un em ploy ment  du ra tion  for  con strained
and  un con strained  in di vid u als.  If  the  li quid ity  ef fect  is  im por tant,  it  can  mit i gate  the  dis in cen tive  cre ated 
through the moral haz  ard ef  fect, and the to  tal ef  fect of UI becomes less distortionary than previously
thought (Chetty, 2008).
To add in  tu  ition to these out  comes, we first think of the work  ers’ li  quid  ity con  straints as in Mortensen
(1986). The li  quid  ity con  straint is in  tro  duced in the model with the as  sump  tion that the worker is able to
self-fi  nan  ce the job search costs only for a fi nite time. This im plies that con  strained work  ers find it more 
dif  fi cult to smooth con  sump tion over la  bor mar ket states, and for them, UI might cre  ate a li quid  ity ef  fect 
that oc  curs in ad  di  tion to, and in  de  pend  ently, of the usual moral haz  ard ef  fect. When a con  strained
worker re  lies on UI ben e  fits to main  tain con  sump  tion, in creases in the du  ra  tion or fi  nan  cial cov er  age of 
the UI ben  e  fit would re  duce the pres  sure to find a job. On the other hand, if the worker is un  con  -
strained, the li  quid  ity ef  fect chan  nel is less rel  e  vant, since UI ben  e  fits would be a small por  tion of life  -
time wealth. Thus, the li  quid  ity ef  fect would pre  dict a larger increase in unemployment duration for
constrained individuals.
This ex  tra time to search for a new job can also have a pos  i  tive im  pact on post-un  em  ploy  ment out  -
comes, im  prov  ing job match qual  ity . The im  pact of the UI sys  tem on pro  duc  tiv  ity and job mis  match
has been ex  am  ined in sev  eral the  o  ret  i  cal pa  pers.  Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) pres  ent a model of the
role of UI on mis match and un em  ploy  ment and show the pos  i  tive im  pact of the UI sys  tem on the re  duc  -
tion of job mis  match. In a re  lated pa  per,  Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) an  a  lyze the pro  duc  tiv  ity gains
from more gen  er  ous UI sys  tems. Con  sid  er  ing risk-averse work  ers, they show that UI in  creases la  bor
pro  duc  tiv  ity by en  cour  ag  ing both work  ers to seek higher pro  duc  tiv  ity jobs and firms to cre  ate such
jobs. In their set  ting, the UI is more than a search sub sidy, and affects the type of jobs that workers look 
for and accept.
The im  pact of UI on match qual  ity re  mains, none  the  less, an em  pir  i  cal is  sue. There are only a lim  ited
num  ber of stud  ies ad  dress  ing the im  pact of UI on post-un  em  ploy  ment out  comes, and they have con  -
cen  trated al  most ex  clu  sively on the wage di  men  sion of job match qual  ity (see Ad  di  son and Blackburn,
2000). Belzil (2001) looks at job du  ra  tion by ex  plor  ing a re  duc  tion in the ini  tial en  ti  tle  ment pe  riod rule in
Can  ada to study the im  pact of UI du  ra  tion on sub  se  quent job du  ra  tion for young in  di  vid  u  als, and re  -
ports a weak but pos  i  tive im  pact. More re  cently, Centeno (2004), Centeno and Novo (2006) and Mc  -
Call and Chi (2008) look at the US sys  tem, us  ing UI vari  a  tion across states, and find ev  i  dence that a
more gen  er  ous UI in  creases the ten  ure of reemployment and that this impact is stronger at longer
tenures.
Re  cently, a num  ber of pa  pers con  sid  ered the im  pact of UI on post-un  em  ploy  ment out  comes us  ing ad  -
min is tra tive data for Eu ro pean coun tries. Lalive (2008) and Lalive (2007) use Aus  trian data from an ex -
ten  sion of UI ben  e  fits and re  port a sig  nif  i  cant im  pact on un  em  ploy  ment du  ra  tion but no im  pact on
wages. Lalive re  ports that an ex  ten  sion of 170 weeks of UI ben  e  fits in  creases quite sig  nif  i  cantly un  em  -
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ings in the post-un  em  ploy  ment job com  pared to the pre-un  em  ploy  ment job, the im  pact was null for
men, whereas for women there is a sta  tis  ti  cally non-signifficant gain of 1 per cent. Sim  i  lar re  sults are
ob  tained in the stud  ies by Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007) for Ger  many and in van Ours and Vodopivec
(2008) for Slovenia. In par  tic  u  lar, van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) ana  lyse the im  pact of a re  duc  tion in
the en ti tle ment pe riod. They re  port for men a small and in  sig  nif i  cant de cline in wages and for women, a 
pos  i  tive and in  sig  nif  i  cant in  crease. Card, Chetty and Webber (2007) also uses data from Aus  tria and
finds some impact of severance payments on reemployment job tenure, but no impact on wages.
3. DATA
Our study uses ad  min  is  tra  tive data col  lected by Instituto de Informática of the Por  tu  guese So  cial Se  -
cu rity  bu reau.  The  dataset  reg is tered  all  sub si dized  un em ploy ment  spells  ini ti ated  be tween  Jan u ary
1998 and the end of 2002. The data in  clude all rel  e  vant in  for  ma  tion in terms of sub  si  dized un  em  ploy  -
ment du  ra  tion, pre-un  em  ploy  ment wage and date and wage of the first job af  ter the sub  si  dized un  em  -
ploy  ment spell. The data also in  clude in  for  ma  tion on the in  di  vid  ual’s age at the be  gin  ning of the
un  em  ploy  ment spell, the gen  der, re  gional (22 dis  tricts) location and the starting month of
unemployment.
We are able to fol  low in  di  vid u  als un til their ben e  fits ex  pired or they found a job. Thus, we con sider com  -
plete spells of sub si dized un em ploy  ment, which cor re spond to a sin gle-cy  cle/flow sam pling scheme as 
de  fined in Lancaster (1992).
4. A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY APPROACH
Our ex  er  cise takes ad  van  tage of the rules of the Por  tu  guese UI sys  tem to iden  tify the causal ef  fect of
lon  ger UI en  ti  tle  ment pe  ri  ods on job search du  ra  tion and reemployment match qual  ity. Af  ter July 1999,
for  in di vid u als  youn ger  than  45  years  at  the  mo ment  of  en ter ing  un em ploy ment,  the  en ti tle ment  pe riod
is fully de  ter  mined by their age. Thus, the law gen  er  ates two sharp dis  con  ti  nu  ities in the en  ti  tle  ment
period at ages 30 and 40 (Table 1).
In this set  ting, it is ex  tremely ap  peal  ing to use the re  gres  sion dis  con  ti  nu  ity de  sign. This method is
rather  in tu itive.  In  the  pres ent  con text,  it  com pares  the  be hav ior  (un em ploy ment  du ra tion  and
reemployment wages) of the un  em  ployed aged 29(39) to that of those aged 30(40); ar  gu  ably, these in  -
di vid u als  share  (on  av er age)  rather  sim i lar  char ac ter is tics,  ex cept  for  the  en ti tle ment  pe riod:  12(18)
months for the 29(39) years old and 18(24) months for the 30(40) years old. Thus, any dif  fer  ences in
the out  come vari  ables be  tween in  di  vid  u  als that dif  fer by one year of age is at  trib  uted, with a causal in  -
ter  pre  ta  tion, to the only difference between them, namely the entitlement periods.
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Table 1
AGE AND ENTITLEMENT PERIODS (IN MONTHS)
Age 
(a) [15, 29] [30, 39] [40, 44] [45, 64]
Entitlement period 12 18 24 30 (+8) 
(b)
Notes: The in for ma tion re fers to the UI law in place be tween July, 1999 and De cem ber, 2006. (a) The en ti tle ment pe riod is de ter mined by the age of the un em ployed at the mo ment of un -
em ploy ment.  (b)  For each 5 years of so  cial se  cu  rity con  tri  bu  tions, the UI ben  e  fits are pro  longed 2 months up to 8 months.Chart 1 sum  ma  rizes the es  sence of the iden  ti  fi  ca  tion strat  egy fol  lowed in this pa  per. On the left-hand
side panel, which plots av  er  age sub  si  dized un  em  ploy  ment du  ra  tion (in days) by age, there are two
clear dis  con  ti  nu  ity points at ages 30 and 40. These co  in  cide with the 6 months dis  con  ti  nu  ities in  tro  -
duced by the leg  is  la  tor in the age-based UI en ti  tle  ment pe  ri  ods: from 12 to 18 months at age 30 and 18
to 24 months for older in  di  vid  u  als. To these in  creases in the UI en  ti  tle  ment pe  riod, in  di  vid  u  als re  spond
un equiv o cally  by  ex tend ing  their  sub si dized  un em ploy ment  spells;  there  are  sig nif i cant  dis con ti nu ities
at ages 30 and 40, which sug  gests that add  ing a size  able 6 months to po  ten  tial ben  e  fits re  sults in lon  -
ger  av er age  sub si dized  un em ploy ment  du ra tion.
1
The right-hand side of Chart 1 pres  ents ev  i  dence of the im  pact of lon  ger UI en  ti  tle  ment pe  ri  ods on
post-un em ploy ment  job  match  qual ity,  in dexed  by  the  log  dif fer ence  be tween  pre-un em ploy ment  and
reemployment wages. Over all, this chart sug gests a much smaller im pact than for the case of du ra tion. 
In deed,  su per im posed  re gres sion  lines  at  the  dis con ti nu ity  points  sug gest  a  tiny  neg a tive  im pact  at  the
first dis  con  ti  nu  ity (29/30 years), and a small im  pact for older in  di  vid  u  als (39/40 years). In the fol  low  ing
sec  tion, these re  sults will be fur  ther exploited in an appropriate econometric setting.
4.1. Econometric results
The  re gres sion  dis con ti nu ity  de sign  can  be  for mal ized  by  spec i fy ing  the  fol low ing  model:
y D i i i = + + + a t x e ( ) a (1)
where y i  is the out come vari able for in di vid ual i, and the ef  fect of the forc ing vari able a (age in our case 
de  ter  mines (forces) the length of the ben  e  fits) on the de  pend  ent vari  able is cap  tured by the func  tion 
( ) x . ,  typ i cally  a  poly no mial. D i  is a di  chot  o  mous treat  ment vari  able, as  sum  ing value 1 if the in  di  vid  ual
i be  longs to the group with lon  ger en  ti  tle  ment period. In particular, 
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Chart 1
SUBSIDIZED UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION AND REEMPLOYMENT WAGE CHANGE
Panel B  Panel A
Source:II MTSS’ data - au  thors cal  cu  la  tions.
Note: Av  er  age sub  si  dized un  em  ploy  ment spells by age (left panel) and log dif  fer  ence be  tween pre-un  em  ploy  ment and reemployment wages (right panel). In  di  vid  u  als aged 30-39 have
an en  ti  tle  ment pe  riod 6 months lon  ger than the youn  gest co  hort and 6 months shorter than the old  est co  hort, 40-44. See Ta  ble 1 for ex  act entitlement periods.
(1) Using survey data,  Addison and Portugal (2007) study the impact of the Portuguese UI rules on transitions out of unemployment into employment. They use 
survey data from the Inquérito ao Emprego for a different time period (more precisely 1992-97). They do not study the impact on reemployment wages, nor
























de pend ing  on  the  dis con ti nu ity  thresh old  that  is  un der  anal y sis.  The  im pact  of  par tic i pa tion  in  the  treat -
ment is given di  rectly by the es  ti  mate of the pa  ram  e  ter t at the point where the treat  ment vari  able
switches from 0 to 1. Hann, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) dis  cuss
at length this method.
Ta ble  2  sum ma rizes  the  re gres sion  dis con ti nu ity  de sign  es ti mates  for  the  two  dis con ti nu ity  points,
based on the sam  pling pe  riod af  ter July, 1999 cov  er  ing 18,457 un  em  ploy  ment spells for in  di  vid  u  als
aged 25 to 44 that ended up in reemployment.
Con  firm  ing the vi  sual in  spec  tions of the pre  vi  ous sec  tion, the re  sults in Ta  ble 2 show a size  able im  pact
on  du ra tion.  In deed,  the  es ti mates  point  to  an  av er age  in crease  on  sub si dized  un em ploy ment  du ra tion 
of 43.5 days for in  di  vid  u  als aged 30 and 36.1 days for older individuals.
The  in crease  in  the  en ti tle ment  pe riod  and  the  ad di tional  du ra tion  of  sub si dized  un em ploy ment  did  not
bring about, on av  er  age, higher reemployment wages. On the con  trary, the im  pact is mi  nus 1 per  cen  t
at  both  dis con ti nu ity  points.
Note that the ad di  tion of con  trol vari  ables does not have any sig  nif i  cant im pact on the es  ti mates, as it is 
ex  pected in these set tings (Imbens and Lemieux , 2008). There  fore, for rea sons of sta  tis ti  cal ef  fi  ciency 
(Lee, 2008), we will use the spec  i  fi  ca  tion with con  trol vari  ables in the fol  low  ing anal  y  sis.
2
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Table 2
IMPACT ON THE DURATION OF SUBSIDIZED UNEMPLOYMENT (IN DAYS) AND ON REEMPLOYMENT
WAGES (RATE OF CHANGE)
Discontinuity: 30 years Discontinuity: 40 years
Pre-unemployment wages Pre-unemployment wages
Below median Above median Below median Above median
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsidized unemployment duration 44.8 43.5 44.4 36.1
(5.82) (5.59) (8.46) (8.10)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Reemployment wage gains -0.009 -0.010 -0.015 -0.012
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
0.480 0.416 0.343 0.429
Number of observations 15,497 15,497 11,891 11,891
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
Control variables No Yes No Yes
Source: II MTSS’ data - au  thors’ cal  cu  la  tions.
Notes: In  cludes all UI claims from July, 1999 to De  cem  ber, 2002. Au  thors’ com  pu ta  tions. The point es  ti  mates are based on lo  cal lin ear re  gres  sion with rect  an gu lar ker  nel. The im  pact is
ex pressed in days for du ra tion and log points dif  fer  ence for reemployment wages. Stan dard er  rors in pa ren  the ses, and be  low the p-val  ues. The band  width “¥” weights equally all ob ser  -
va  tions; for ex  am  ple, at the 30-years dis  con  ti  nu ity thresh  old, point es  ti  mates to the left are based on 5 age-points (25 to 29) and to the right on 10 age-points (30 to 39). The con  trol vari  -
ables in cluded are: women, dis trict, un em ploy ment month, reemployment month, and un em ploy ment year. For the re gres sion of sub si dized un em ploy ment du ra tion, pre-un em ploy ment
wages are also included in the set of control variables.
(2) The set of control variables included are listed in the notes to Table tab:all. We experimented with other bandwidths, but the results resemble those reported
in the Table 2.Li quid ity  ef fect:  The  im pact  on  un em ploy ment  du ra tion
The above anal  y  sis col  lapses the im  pact into a sim  ple av  er  age, but the iden  ti  fi  ca  tion of the li  quid  ity ef  -
fect rests on in  di  vid  ual dif  fer  ences in the de  grees of li  quid  ity con  straints. This is par  tic  u  larly im  por  tant
in the anal  y  sis of UI re  gimes in which the ex  ten  sion of ben  e  fits ac  crues only af  ter a long pe  riod of un  -
em  ploy  ment. In such cases, it is ex  pected that the nonstationarity of the job search en  vi  ron  ment will af  -
fect one group of workers more than another.
To iden  tify the li  quid  ity ef  fect, the first task is to iden  tify in  di  vid  ual dif  fer  ences in the de  grees of li  quid  ity
con  straints. How  ever, the ‘con  strained’ sta  tus is a la  tent vari  able. As such, it is not fea  si  ble to clas  sify
in  di  vid  u  als, di  rectly from the data, into dis  tinct groups of li  quid  ity con  straints. The ap  proach fol  lowed to
iden  tify these groups is to use the 12-month av  er  age of pre-un  em  ploy  ment wages as an in  dex for the
distribution of liquidity constraints.
The use of wages as an in  dex is jus  ti  fied by the work of  Ziliak (2003), who shows that wages are the
lead ing fac tor driv ing dif fer ences be tween poor and rich house holds in terms of net worth to per ma nent 
in  come ra  tio. Fur  ther  more, he shows also that many low-life  time-in  come house  holds ac  cu  mu  late lit  tle
wealth rel  a  tive to their in  comes. Sim  i  lar in  di  ca  tions for the Por  tu  guese econ  omy are re  ported in
Centeno and Novo (2007).
Thus, to better un  der  stand the be  hav  ior of work  ers at each ex  treme of the in  come dis  tri  bu  tion, and at
dif  fer  ent de  grees of li  quid  ity con  straints, we split the sam  ple into 4 subsamples, each cor  re  spond  ing to
an  in come  quartile  of  the  pre-un em ploy ment  in come.  Ad di tion ally,  we  con sider  only  in di vid u als  with
pre-un  em  ploy  ment in  come rang  ing be  tween 1.5 and 4.5 min  i  mum wages. In the Por  tu  guese UI sys  -
tem, these in di vid u als share the same gross re place ment rate, 65 per cen t, that is, UI rep re sents 65 per 
cent of the be  fore taxes pre-un  em  ploy  ment wages. This op  tion re  duces the scope for dif  fer  ent labor
supply disincentives (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2007).
The re  sults sup  port the ex  is  tence of a UI li  quid  ity ef  fect (Ta  ble 3). Ex  cept for the un em  ployed in the first
quartile, the re  sponse of the re  main  ing in  di  vid  u  als by de  gree of li  quid  ity con  straint is as ex  pected:
smaller in creases in un  em  ploy  ment spells for in di  vid  u  als with lower li  quid  ity con  straints. This pat  tern is 
com  mon to both age-dis  con  ti  nu  ities, and com  pat  i  ble with the li  quid  ity ef  fect re  ported above, but high  -
lights the ex  is  tence of other mech  a  nisms that con  di  tion the re  sponse of in  di  vid  u  als at each ex  treme of
the wage dis  tri bu  tion. The be  hav  ior of the more con strained is ex  plained by the nonstationarity char  ac  -
ter is tics of the la bor mar ket faced by these in di vid u als, a fact that may hin  der their ca pa bil ity to re spond 
to the in  creased en  ti  tle  ment pe  ri  ods of the UI sys  tem (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2006). A pos  si  ble ex  pla  -
na  tion for this re sult rests on the het  er  o  ge  ne  ity of the ar rival rate of job of  fers. The im  por  tance of the ar -
rival rate of job of  fers in shap  ing un  em  ploy  ment du  ra  tion has been well doc  u  mented in the lit  er  a  ture
(Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007). Based on Eu  ro  pean Panel House  hold Sur  vey data, in Por  tu  gal
and France, low-ed  u  cated work  ers re  ceive only half of the num  ber of job of  fers re  ceived by work  ers
with col  lege de  grees (Ad  di  son, Centeno and Por  tu  gal, 2009). Such dif  fer  ences in the ar  rival rate might
lead low-wage work  ers to ac  cept ear  lier job of  fers or else face a very high risk of remaining
unemployed after UI expires, contributing to explain their smaller reaction to the policy (dis)incentive.
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A dif  fer  en  ti  ated im  pact is also ob  served for reemployment wages; gains are con  cen  trated at the low
end of the in  come dis  tri  bu  tion, while losses ap  pear to be the rule at the high end. At the 30-year-old
thresh  old, rel  a  tively to the counterfactual (29-year-old), the sign on log vari  a  tion at the quartiles be  low
the me  dian is pos  i  tive (3.4 and 2.7 per  cen  t), while the im  pact on the top two quartiles is neg  a  tive
(reach  ing -6.5 per  cen  t for the 4th quartile) with sta  tis  ti  cal p-val  ues suf  fi  ciently close or be  low 0.10.
Older in  di  vid  u  als in the first quartile ex  pe  ri  ence a pos  i  tive and size  able im  pact (7.8 per  cen  t); at the
other quartiles the im  pact on reemployment wages is neg  a  tive, reach  ing -3.9 per  cen  t.
3
5. A DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES APPROACH
The re form of the UI sys  tem in July 1999 pro  vides an al ter na tive source of iden ti fi ca tion of the im pact of 
UI on post-un  em  ploy  ment out  comes that is ex  plored in this sec  tion. The re  form changed the en  ti  tle  -
ment pe  riod for some age groups in the pop  u  la  tion. Be  fore the re  form, the Por  tu  guese leg  is  la  tion di  -
vided work  ers youn  ger than 45 years old into 5 age-groups with dif  fer  ent en  ti  tle  ment pe  ri  ods. The
re  form made this pe  riod larger for 3 out of the 5 groups, leav  ing the re  main  ing two groups un  changed
(Ta  ble 4). Thus, the leg  is  la  tion cre  ated a quasi-ex  per  i  men  tal set  ting, that is, it cre  ated a sit  u  a  tion
where  there  are  in di vid u als  re ceiv ing  a  “treat ment”  and  in di vid u als  re ceiv ing  a  “pla cebo”.  The  first
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Table 3
IMPACT ON DURATION (IN DAYS) AND REEMPLOYMENT WAGES (RATE OF CHANGE) BY
PRE-UNEMPLOYMENT WAGE QUARTILES
Discontinuity: 30 years Discontinuity: 40 years

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Subsidized unemployment duration 39.7 58.5 53.0 51.4 34.2 64.1 55.0 20.5
(12.7) (13.2) (12.4) (13.3) (19.0) (18.8) (20.1) (18.7)
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.001 0.006 0.273
Reemployment wage gains 0.034 0.027 -0.043 -0.065 0.078 -0.036 -0.019 -0.039
(0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.037) (0.025) (0.028) (0.036) (0.043)
0.110 0.273 0.122 0.081 0.002 0.193 0.588 0.374
Number of observations 2945 2982 2985 2911 2189 2284 2211 2349
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidth ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: II MTSS’ data - au  thors’ cal  cu  la  tions.
Notes: These es ti mates are based on in di vid u als with gross re place ment rates in the 63 to 67 per cen t range. Stan dard er rors in pa ren the ses and be low the p-val ues. See notes to Ta ble 2 
for  ad di tional  details.
(3) Notice that the GRR restriction, i.e. wages in the 1.5 to 4.5 minimum wages range, applies only to pre-unemployment wages. In the post-unemployment
period, we require only individuals to have a full-time job, meaning that the lower bound of reemployment wages is equal to the minimum wage. Therefore,
reemployment wages are not bounded from below, resulting in possible negative wage changes.group is clas  si  fied as the treat  ment group – the group that ben  e  fit  ted from the ex  ten  sion of the en  ti  tle  -
ment pe  riod –, and the sec  ond group is designated as control group – the one that kept the same
entitlement period.
The char  ac  ter  is  tics of the re  form re  sult in two nat  u  ral pairs of treat  ment and con  trol groups, namely,
([15, 24] vs. [25, 29]) and ([30, 34] vs. [35, 39]). For com  pa  ra  bil  ity rea  sons, we chose the lat  ter. Thus,
our treat  ment group in  cludes all in  di  vid  u  als aged 30 to 34 and the con  trol group all in  di  vid  u  als aged 35
to 39.
In this ap  pli  ca  tion we are also able to use in  for  ma  tion from the pe  ri  ods be  fore and af  ter the re  form. The
first pe  riod com  prises all un  em  ploy  ment spells ini  ti  ated be  fore July, 1999, which were un  der the rules
prior to the UI re  form. The af  ter-pe riod com prises all un em  ploy  ment spells ini  ti  ated be  tween July, 1999 
and De  cem  ber, 2002. This pos  si  bil  ity al  lows us to con  trol for any dif  fer  ences that might ex  ist be  tween
the two groups, pro  vided they were not af  fected by the treat  ment it  self. Also, the ex  is  tence of a con  trol
group al  lows us to elim  i  nate the im  pact of changes in eco  nomic con  di  tions over  time, also pro  vided
they af  fect in the same fashion the treatment and control individuals.
The avail  abil  ity of data for the pre- and post-leg  is  la  tive re  form pe  ri  ods makes it pos  si  ble to con  trol for
mac ro eco nomic de vel op  ments that af  fected the be hav iour of both groups over time. There fore, the dif  -
fer  ence in the be  hav  ior of the con  trol group from the pre- to the post-re  form pe  riod is used to mea  sure
what would be the per  for  mance of the treat  ment group, in the ab  sence of leg  is  la  tive re  form. Once the
mac ro eco nomic  fac tors  and  the  dif fer ences  in  ob serv able  char ac ter is tics  are  con trolled  for,  any  other
be  hav  ioral dif  fer  ence is therefore attributed to the legislative reform.
In this sec  tion, we con  sider only spells ter  mi  nated with reemployment, and we have a to  tal of 9,675
sub  si  dized un  em  ploy  ment spells. The treat  ment group is com  prised of 4,901 ob  ser  va  tions, of which
2,232 are ob  served be  fore July 1999. The con  trol group has 2,725 ob  ser  va  tions in the be  fore-pe  riod
and 2,049 in the after-period.
We use this setup to study the de  ter  mi  na  tion of post-un  em  ploy  ment wages. We do this by means of an
OLS re  gres  sion model of reemployment wages that ex  plicit con  trols for the im  pact of the reform.
( ) log , W + + + ' = + ´ b b b b l 0 1 2 3 After Treat After Treat X (2)
where Af ter  is an in  di  ca  tor vari  able for the post-July 1999 pe  riod, Treat in  di  cates the age group af  -
fected by the new leg  is  la  tion and the co  ef  fi  cient on the vari  able Af  ter x Treat cap  tures the dif  fer  -
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Table 4
AGE AND ENTITLEMENT PERIODS (IN MONTHS): BEFORE AND AFTER JULY, 1999
Before After







[40, 44] 21 [40, 44] 24
Source: II MTSS’ data - au  thors’ cal  cu  la  tions.
Note: In  for  ma  tion based on the UI law in place be  tween June, 1989 and June, 1999 in the “Be  fore” col  umn, and be  tween July, 1999 and De  cem  ber, 2006 in the “Af  ter” column.ences-in-dif fer ences  im pact  of  the  UI  ex ten sion.  Ad di tion ally,  the  vec tor  X in  cludes the pre  vi  ous
av er age  in come,  in di ca tor  vari ables  for  un em ploy ment  du ra tion  (piecewise  func tion)  and  a  dummy
vari  able that cap  tures the e  ven  t of ben  e  fits ex  haus  tion. A gen  der vari  able and dummy vari  ables for re  -
gional la  bor mar  kets, month of unemployment and of reemployment were also included.
The re  sults are pre  sented in Ta  ble 5. Three main con  clu  sions are worth high  light  ing. First,
reemployment wages fall with un  em  ploy  ment du  ra  tion. This means that the lon  ger an in  di  vid  ual re  -
mains in un  em  ploy  ment the lower the reemployment wage. Sec  ond, in  di  vid  u  als re-em  ployed at the
ben  e  fit ex  haus  tion date or af  ter that mo  ment get a sig  nif  i  cant wage pen  alty. This can be seen as ev  i  -
dence that the res er  va  tion wage falls in a dis  crete way at the mo  ment of UI ex  haus  tion, as pre  dicted by
the job search the  ory. Fi  nally, the co  ef  fi  cient of the vari  able is pos  i  tive, mean  ing that on av  er  age work  -
ers who bene  fited from the ex  ten  sion of the UI en  ti  tle  ment pe  riod may have slightly higher
reemployment wages, relative to those who did not benefit from this extension.
To fur  ther an  a  lyze the de  creas  ing pat  tern of reemployment wages we fi  nally asked whether the wage
gain brought about by lon  ger entitlements is also de  creas  ing with the un  em  ploy  ment spell du  ra  tion. In
or  der to do this we in  ter  act the vari  able with the un  em  ploy  ment du  ra  tion vari  able. The re  sults are pre  -
sented in Chart 2, for the whole sam  ple and for males and fe  males sep  a  rately. First, in all three cases
the rel  a  tive wage gains from lon  ger un  em  ploy  ment spells are de  creas  ing in the du  ra  tion of the spell.
In  deed, the gains are con  cen  trated at the be  gin  ning of the spell. Sec  ond, the im  pact is much stron  ger
for fe  males than for males, with gains accruing exclusively to females.
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Table 5
AVERAGE TREATMENT IMPACT ON (LOG) REEMPLOYMENT WAGES: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
Regression Coefficient Standard deviation p-value
Difference-in-differences
Intercept 3.042 0.10 0.000
After 0.003 0.01 0.840
Treat -0.011 0.01 0.400
Af  ter x Treat 0.028 0.02 0.120
Log(Pre-unemployment wages) 0.489 0.02 0.000
Days to reemployment:
[1, 60] 0.140 0.02 0.000
[61, 90] 0.128 0.03 0.000
[91, 120] 0.107 0.03 0.000
[121, 240] 0.086 0.03 0.000
[241, 360] 0.060 0.02 0.010
[361, 449] 0.010 0.03 0.690
At the end of the entitlement period -0.325 0.03 0.000
After the end of the entitlement period -0.290 0.02 0.000





Source: II MTSS’ data - au  thors’ cal  cu  la  tions.
Note: Instituto de Informática’s dataset. Au  thors’ com  pu  ta  tions con  sid  er  ing only in  di  vid  u  als that claimed UI be  tween Jan  u  ary, 1998 and June, 2003; the reemployment pe  riod may sur  -
pass June, 2003, but oc curs un til De cem ber, 2004. The es ti mates are based on the dif fer ence-in-dif fer ences es ti ma tor. The im pact on the reemployment wages is given by the co ef fi cient
of the vari able “Af ter x Treat”, and it is ex pressed in log points. The vari able “At the end of the en ti tle ment pe riod” iden ti fies the ob ser va tions in which the start ing month of the job co in cides
with the ex haus tion date of un em ploy ment in sur ance ben e fit. The vari able “Af ter the end of the en ti tle ment pe riod” iden ti fies the ob ser va tions in which the start ing month of the job is after
the exhaustion date of unemployment insurance benefit.6. CONCLUSIONS
When con sid er ing the ev i dence fa vor able to the ex is tence of a li quid ity ef fect of UI, we de tect a pos i tive 
im  pact in post-un  em  ploy  ment job match qual  ity for the more con  strained in  di  vid  u  als, those at the bot  -
tom of the in  come dis  tri  bu  tion. The non-distortionary na  ture of the li  quid  ity ef  fect, which re  duces the
pres  sure on low in  come work  ers to ac  cept low pro  duc  tiv  ity jobs and al  lows them to wait for a better
match, is as  so  ci  ated with a greater (and positive) impact on reemployment wages.
Ad  di  tional ev  i  dence shows that the pos  i  tive im  pact of ex  tend  ing UI was ob  served only at short un  em  -
ploy  ment du  ra  tions and bene  fited more groups with poorer la  bor mar  ket pros  pects. The re  sults re  in  -
force the scope for a re  form of the UI sys  tem tar  get  ing low in  come in  di  vid  u  als, those who ben  e  fit the
most from it, not only in terms of smooth  ing con  sump  tion, but also in terms of reemployment out  -
comes. Very long en  ti  tle  ment pe  ri  ods have a lim  ited scope in reaching the main goals of any UI
system.
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Chart 2
SUBSIDIZED UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION AND REEMPLOYMENT WAGES
Source:II MTSS’ data - au  thors cal  cu  la  tions.
Note: Dif  fer  ence-in-dif  fer  ences es  ti  mates: Im  pact on reemployment wages along the du  ra  tion of the un  em  ploy  ment spell. From
left-to-right pan  els, per  cent  age im  pact for the over  all, males, and fe  males sam  ples. Dashed lines rep  re  sent 95 per  cen  t con  fi  -
dence in ter vals. The im pact on wages is ob tained by in clud ing in model (2) an in ter ac tion term be tween the in di ca tor of the re form 
( ) After x Treat  and the duration of unemployment.REFERENCES
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